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ABSTRACT
Prediction markets and other reward mechanisms based on
proper scoring rules can elicit accurate predictions about
future events with public outcomes. However, many ques-
tions of public interest do not always have a clear answer.
For example, facts such as the effects of raising or lower-
ing interest rates can never be publicly verified, since only
one option will be implemented. In this paper we address re-
porting incentives for opinion polls and questionnaires about
hypothetical questions, where the honesty of one answer can
only be assessed in the context of the other answers elicited
through the poll. We extend our previous work on this prob-
lem by four main results. First, we prove that no reward
mechanism can be strictly incentive compatible when the
mechanism designer does not know the prior information of
the participants. Second, we formalize the notion of help-
ful reporting which prescribes that rational agents move the
public result of the poll towards what they believe to be the
true distribution (even when that involves reporting an an-
swer that is not the agent’s first preference). Third, we show
that helpful reporting converges the final result of the poll
to the true distribution of opinions. Finally, we present a
reward scheme that makes helpful reporting an equilibrium
for polls with an arbitrary number of answers. Our mecha-
nism is simple, and does not require information about the
prior beliefs of the agents.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Soliciting opinions or predictions through electronic chan-
nels has become an important component of our digital so-
ciety. Companies, governments and private individuals com-
monly run opinion polls, questionnaires or prediction mar-
kets to solicit feedback or advice from the users. While the
types of information elicited varies widely, we assume in this
paper that the task is to report one of a finite number k of
EC’11,
outcomes, for example an observation, or the probability of
one of these outcomes.
For the validity of such mechanisms, it is important that
the contributions be truthful. For settings that involve pre-
dictions of an outcome that will eventually be known, there
are several schemes that reward truthful reporting based on
comparison with this outcome. Most of these are based on
proper scoring rules [18] that compute rewards to be paid
based on comparing the prediction with the true outcome
once it has become known. Lambert, Pennock and Shoham
[13] [14] [12] provide a complete characterization of what
information can be truthfully elicited using proper scoring
rules. An alternative are prediction markets [3], where par-
ticipants express their opinion by buying securities that pay
off if a certain outcome actually occurs, and expire without
payoff otherwise. Such markets have achieved remarkable
accuracy for problems such as a predicting the outcome of
presidential elections or the completion of a software de-
velopment projects [1], [5], [2], [16]. To solve the problem
of lack of liquidity, prediction markets are usually comple-
mented with a market maker that provides unbounded liq-
uidity and thus ensures an efficient market. Such market
makers can also be constructed on the basis of proper scor-
ing rules [7] to ensure that truthful reporting is the dominant
strategy.
For a large class of questions, however, the true outcome will
never be known. These include predictions of hypothetical
events, such as
• What economic growth will result if we raise the inter-
est rates by 0.5 percent?
• Will there be a famine in country X if the harvest fails
two times in a row?
where the outcome can never be verified if the action is not
taken, but also many questions where verification would be
too costly, for example
• What is the failure rate of vacuum cleaner X?
• What is the success rate of plumber X?
• What is the average connection speed of internet provider
X?
In such cases, neither scoring rules nor prediction markets
can be used to elicit truthful information.
However, it is possible to use the coherence of a report with
others to incentivize truthfulness. In contrast to the case
of verifiable outcomes, where truthful reporting is the dom-
inant strategy, the goal is now to make truthful reporting
an equilibrium strategy by comparing the reports provided
by different agents and rewarding them based on how well
they agree. Provided that most reports are truthful, it is
then a best response to also report truthfully, and truthful
reporting becomes a Nash equilibrium. Miller, Resnick and
Zeckhauser [15] give a full analysis of how proper scoring
rules can be adapted to this setting and called it the peer
prediction method. In essence, the peer prediction method
assumes that a report of a value x amounts to reporting
a certain probability that another report, the reference re-
port, also reports the value x. The mechanism then applies
a proper scoring rule to this predicted probability, taking
the reference report as the true outcome. Miller et al. [15]
show that for any proper scoring rule, such a mechanism has
a Nash equilibrium where all agents report their opinion x
truthfully.
Jurca and Faltings [8] [9] extend the results of Miller et al. by
applying the principal of Automated Mechanism Design [4]
to design a mechanism that is optimal under some cost ob-
jective. Goel Reeves and Pennock [6] describe a mechanism
that is also able to collect the confidence of the reporters.
However, peer prediction methods have an important draw-
back: in order to apply the scoring rule mechanism, it is
necessary to know the probability distribution that the rater
assigns to the reference report. This assumption is not very
realistic in practice. While it is possible to design scoring
rules that are robust against variations in this probability,
[20], [10] has shown that only small variations can be toler-
ated and that even these can require vastly higher rewards.
One relaxation of this requirement comes in a mechanism
called the Bayesian Truth Serum [17] which works by asking
reporters to also estimate the final distribution of reports.
The agent’s report and the estimate of the final distribution
can be used as a basis for rewards that enforce a truthful
equilibrium.
In our previous work [11] we presented an opinion poll mech-
anism for settings with 2 possible answers that does not
require knowledge of agent beliefs. When the current poll
result is far from a rater’s private beliefs, the rater will file
reports that may not always be truthful but are certain to
drive the poll result closer to its own beliefs. For a popula-
tion of raters with uniform beliefs (for example, rater that
all report on the same observation), the poll converges to an
equilibrium where it indicates this belief.
This paper brings four main additions to our previous re-
sults. First, we prove that no reward mechanism can be
strictly incentive compatible (in the sense that every par-
ticipant always reports her honest opinion) if the designer
does not know the agents’ prior information (Section 3). Sec-
ond, we formalize the notion of helpful reporting (Section 4)
which prescribes that rational agents move the public result
of the poll towards what they believe to be the true distri-
bution, even when that involves reporting an answer that is
not the agent’s first preference. Third, we show that helpful
reporting converges the final result of the poll to the true dis-
tribution of opinions. Finally, we present a reward scheme
that makes helpful reporting an equilibrium for polls with an
arbitrary number of answers (Section 4.2). We believe that
this contribution is an important step forward for demon-
strating the practicality of incentive-based mechanisms for
real life information elicitation scenarios.
2. THE SETTING
We assume a setting where a principal (he) asks a question to
a large set of agents. The question has N possible answers,
denoted as A = {a1, a2, . . . aN}, and every agent (she) is
allowed to report exactly one answer.
Every agent i has a private belief that the answer to the
question should be oi ∈ A, and no agent knows exactly what
other agents believe. Agents are assumed rational and may
choose to report a false answer. However, agents are not
allowed to collude by using side-communication channels to
coordinate their reports.
Let ∆(A) be the set of probability distributions over the set
of answers. The population profile ω is described by the
probability vector (ω1, ω2, . . . ωN ) ∈ ∆(A) where the frac-
tion of agents believing in answer ai is ωi ∈ (0, 1). The
agent’s opinions (i.e., the answer they believe in) are drawn
independently according to a true (unknown) population
profile.
Let Ω be the random variable representing the true popula-
tion profile. The prior p(ω) = Pr[Ω = ω] is assumed to be
common knowledge among the agents, but is not known to
the principal. For any distribution p(ω), the prior probabil-
ity that an agent endorses the answer a is:
Pr[a] =
∫
ω∈∆(A)
Pr[a|ω]p(ω)dω
All answers are assumed possible, such that the prior prob-
abilities Pr[a] are bounded away from 0 by a finite amount.
If oi ∈ A is the private opinion of agent i, the private pos-
terior of that agent regarding the distribution of population
profiles is computed according to the Bayes’ Law:
p(ω|oi) = Pr[Ω = ω|oi] = Pr(oi|ω)p(ω)
Pr[oi]
and the posterior probability that some other agent believes
the answer a ∈ A can be computed as:
Pr[a|oi] =
∫
ω∈∆(A)
Pr[a|ω]p(ω|oi)dω
We impose one more restriction on the information struc-
ture, namely that every answer a is the best predictor for
itself:
Pr[a|a] > Pr[a|b] ∀a, b ∈ A (1)
namely that the posterior belief on the probability of an-
swer a is highest when the agent actually believes in an-
swer a. Note, however, that Equation 1 does not imply
Pr[a|a] > Pr[b|a]; agents who endorse the answer a accept
that some other answer b may be more popular among the
other poll participants. This intuitive constraint is satisfied
by many natural probability distributions (e.g., the Dirichlet
distribution).
The principal keeps a running statistics about the answers
submitted by the agents. The statistic is updated in rounds,
indexed by the variable t = 1, 2, . . .. The agents privately
report their answers to the principal (no other agents can in-
tercept the communication between the agent and the prin-
cipal), however, the principal publishes the running statistic
at the end of every round. For simplicity, we assume the
principal reveals the histogram of the received answers, de-
noted as Rt = (Rt1, R
t
2, . . . R
t
N ) where R
t
i is the number of
ai answers submitted by the previous agents in the rounds
(1, 2, . . . t). Let R¯t be the normalized statistics:
R¯ti =
Rti∑N
i=1 R
t
i
We will also refer to Rt and R¯t as the public information or
statistics available at time t. Let R be the set of all possible
histograms Rt. Naturally, ∆(A) is the set of all possible
normalized statistics R¯t.
As compensation for the information, the principal offers
payment to the agents. The payment received by an agent
depends on her report and on any other information known
to the principal. We consider the simplest family of pay-
ment functions, where the payment to the agent is a function
τ(a, a∗, R¯t) depending on:
• the answer a ∈ A submitted by the agent,
• the reference answer a∗ reported by some other agent,
• the public statistics Rt of answers submitted in the
previous rounds.
Note that the principal cannot condition the payments on
the prior p(ω) which he does not know. We also assume
that the reference report a∗ is always drawn from the same
round as the report a such that the agent and the reference
agent had the same public information when they answered
the question. Naturally, this implies that there are at least
two agents reporting in any round t.
The problem of the principal is to design a payment scheme
τ(·, ·, Rt) that encourages the agent to reveal their private
information. A reporting strategy of an agent is a mapping
s : A×R → A, where s(a,Rt) ∈ A is the answer communi-
cated to the principal when the agent believes in the answer
a and the public histogram of reports is Rt. For example
the honest reporting strategy is defined as:
sˆ(a,R) = a; ∀a ∈ A, ∀R ∈ R
For a simpler notation, we will drop whenever possible the
dependence on Rt when expressing payments and strategies.
Thus, τ(a, a∗, Rt) = τ(a, a∗) and s(a,Rt) = s(a), however,
the reader should keep in mind that payments and strategies
may be different for different histograms Rt.
The reporting strategy s is a weak Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium (BNE) if no unilateral deviation from s increases the
expected payment received by the agent. The payment ex-
pected by the agent depends on: (i) the private belief of the
agent oi, (ii) the true private belief of the agent providing
the reference report, and (iii) the reporting strategy s used
by the reference reporter. Formally, the expected payment
V is:
Ea∈A [V ] =
∑
a∈A
Pr[a|oi]τ(oi, s(a))
and the equilibrium condition for the strategy s becomes:∑
a∈A
Pr[a|oi]
(
τ(oi, s(a))− τ(a′, s(a))
) ≥ 0
for all opinions oi ∈ A and deviating reports a′ 6= oi. If the
inequality is strict, the strategy s is a strict equilibrium.
The assumptions we make in this section are standard for
the literature addressing peer prediction mechanisms where
there is no future event with a public outcome that unam-
biguously determines what answers are correct. An impor-
tant difference, however, is that we don’t allow the princi-
pal to condition the incentives mechanisms on the common
knowledge prior beliefs the agents are assumed to have. We
emphasize this as an important practical advantage, since
the resulting mechanism is simpler, and easier to justify to
the users.
3. TRUTHFUL REPORTING
A number of mechanisms [15, 9, 6], show how to design in-
centive compatible payment mechanisms that depend on the
prior beliefs regarding the distribution of population profiles.
The basic idea is that different private opinions trigger dif-
ferent posterior beliefs; an agent believing a will compute
her expected payment according to the distribution Pr[x|a]
while an agent who believes in b will compute her expected
payment according to the distribution Pr[x|b]. Since the
two distributions are different, any payment derived from a
scoring rule will make honest reporting a Nash equilibrium.
The problem, however, is that payments need to depend on
the beliefs Pr[x|a] and Pr[x|b]. When this dependence is not
possible, our first result shows that no payment scheme can
make the truthful reporting strategy a strict1 equilibrium.
The intuition behind the proof is that the same payment
function that enforces honesty under one belief p1(ω) will
also encourage a profitable deviation under another belief
p2(ω). The distributions p1(ω) and p2(ω) are constructed
such that the posteriors p1(ω|a) and p2(ω|b) are equal, i.e.
and agents believing the report a in the first case and b in
the second case have the same posterior beliefs regarding
the distribution of the reference report. Since the payment
is only conditioned on the posterior belief, it may only elicit
one of the answers a or b, not both; therefore, either under
p1 or under p2 the agents have incentives to mis-sreport.
The formal proof of the following theorem shows how to
construct the two priors p1 and p2
1Truthful reporting can, however, be a weak equilibrium if
the principal pays a constant amount for every report.
Theorem 1. There is no payment function τ(a, a∗, Rt)
such that the truthful reporting strategy s∗(a,Rt) = a, ∀a ∈
A is a strict BNE.
Proof. We are looking for two probability distributions
p1(ω) and p2(ω) over the space of possible population profiles
ω ∈ ∆(A) such that any payment that encourages truthful
reporting under p1 encourages lying under p2. We will build
p1 and p2 from the family of Dirichlet distributions. Let p1
be defined by:
p1(ω) =
1
B(α)
N∏
i=1
ωαi−1i
where ω = (ω1, ω2, . . . ωN ) ∈ ∆(A) is the vector of frequen-
cies for each answer, and α = (α1, α2, . . . αN ) ∈ NN , αi > 1
are the Dirichlet coefficients. B(α) is the multinomial beta
function.
If α0 =
∑
i αi, the prior probability of answer ai is:
Pr1[ai] =
∫
ω∈∆(A)
Pr[ai|ω]p1(ω)dω = αi
α0
and the posterior probability of ai given that the agent truly
believes in the answer ai is:
Pr1[ai|ai] =
∫
ω∈∆(A)
Pr[ai|ω]p1(ω|ai)dω = αi + 1
α0 + 1
and the posterior probability of ai given that the agent be-
lieves in some other answer aj is:
Pr1[ai|aj ] =
∫
ω∈∆(A)
Pr[ai|ω]p1(ω|aj)dω = αi
α0 + 1
Let τ(·, ·) be an incentive compatible payment function such
that the truthful reporting strategy sˆ is an equilibrium. The
equilibrium condition states that an agent decreases her ex-
pected pay by falsely reporting the answer b instead of a:
N∑
i=1
Pr1[ai|a] (τ(a, ai)− τ(b, ai)) > 0; (2)
Let us now consider p2(ω) as a Dirichlet distribution with
the parameters α′ defined as follows:
α′a = αa + 1; α
′
b = αb − 1; α′c = αc ∀c ∈ A \ {a, b}
Note that Pr1[ai|a] = Pr2[ai|b]. Therefore, Equation (2)
implies that:
N∑
i=1
Pr2[ai|b] (τ(a, ai)− τ(b, ai)) > 0;
so that an agent who believes the true answer is b will have
the incentive to falsely report a under the prior belief p2.
As the distribution p2 was constructed independently of the
payment scheme τ , it follows that no payment function can
always enforce a truthful equilibrium for all prior beliefs.
4. HELPFUL REPORTING
Since truthful reporting cannot be guaranteed as an equi-
librium, let us turn our attention to other strategies that
are not always truthful, but are still helpful, in the sense
that the public statistics of answers submitted on the equi-
librium path converges to the true population profile. Jurca
and Faltings [11] describe such a helpful equilibrium for a bi-
nary setting, where the question can have only two answers.
In this section we extend our previous results to questions
with an arbitrary number of answers.
The basic idea of a helpful strategy is that agents report
truthfully only when the public statistics of the question-
naire is close enough to their private beliefs. However, when
the public statistics is not close enough, the (possibly) false
reports push the public statistics towards the true private
beliefs. From this perspective, lying reports can still be use-
ful as they help the public information converge towards the
private beliefs.
To visualize how lying strategies can be helpful, consider
a question with three possible answers, A = {a, b, c} and
a common knowledge prior over answer distributions that
makes the answers a and b twice more likely than answer
c: e.g., Pr[a] = Pr[b] = 0.4, P r[c] = 0.2. Also consider
a questionnaire that starts in round t = 1 with a public
statistics R0 = (1, 1, 1), normalized to R¯0 = ( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
).
However unlikely, the answer c is still possible. An agent
who reports in round t = 1 and believes in answer c has two
choices:
• to report c truthfully,
• to falsely report a or b.
Although the latter alternative involves lying, the false re-
port actually helps the public statistic get closer to the dis-
tribution the agent believes to be true. Obviously, when the
public information gets close enough to the private beliefs,
agents can be incentivised to report truthfully, which not
only makes the public statistic accurate, but also allows the
future agents to learn and refine their priors regarding the
true population profile.
We therefore define a helpful reporting strategy by two con-
straints:
Definition 1. A helpful reporting strategy s¯ is defined
by:
1. no agent reports a as long as the public probability of
a is much greater than the prior probability of a, i.e.,
R¯a > Pr[a] + ε1 ⇒ s¯(·) 6= a;
2. s¯ is truthful whenever R¯ is close enough to the prior
probability Pr[·]:
Pr[a]+ε1 > R
t[a] > Pr[a]−ε2, ∀a⇒ s¯(b,Rt) = b, ∀b;
Definition (1) explicitly does not specify what happens when
the public frequency of a certain answer is well below the
private probability, i.e., R¯a < Pr[a]−ε2. As we will show in
the rest of this section, the two conditions above are enough
to prove that (i) the public information converges to the true
population profile and (ii) there are payment functions that
support helpful equilibria.
First, let us show that helpful strategies exist.
Theorem 2. For any prior distribution p(ω) and any pub-
lic statistic R¯ there exists a consistent strategy s that satisfies
the constraints defined by Definition (1).
Proof. If the public statistics R¯ happens to be close
enough to the priors Pr[·] such that Pr[a] + ε1 > R¯ta >
Pr[a]−ε2, the truthful strategy is trivially consistent. If, on
the other hand, R¯ is far from Pr[·] we have to prove that the
first constraint of Definition (1) is not over-constraining: i.e.,
it does not exclude all alternatives. This, again, is trivial,
since R¯a cannot simultaneously be greater than Pr[a] + ε1
for all a.
Note that helpful strategies are parametrized by the two
constants ε1 and ε2, but the proof of Theorem 2 does not
depend on these parameters.
4.1 Convergence
Second, we will show that helpful strategies converge the
public statistics of reported answers to the true population
profile.
Theorem 3. For any population profile ω ∈ ∆(a) and
any prior belief p(ω) it is possible to define a helpful strat-
egy that converges the public statistic of reports to the true
population profile.
Proof. To prove this theorem we need to show that one
can always find the parameters ε1 and ε2 such that the help-
ful strategy defined by ε1, ε2 and the initial prior p(ω) makes
the public statistics of answers converge to the true popula-
tion profile for all ω.
We will show that a helpful strategy follows the following
play pattern: As long as the public statistics R¯t is far from
the prior p(ω), the agents will push the public statistics to-
wards the prior, and within a finite number of rounds, the
public statistic will get close enough to the prior. When
this happens, the agents start reporting honestly, and the
honest reports allow the other agents to refine their priors
by Bayesian updating. It may happen that honest reports
push again the public statistic outside the bounds of the new
prior. However, a new finite sequence of helpful reports will
resolve this divergence. Given enough answers, the principal
obtains a statistics which converges to the true population
profile.
The first step of the proof is to show that there generally
exist the parameters ε1 and ε2 such that helpful reporting
pushes the public statistics R¯t within:
Pr[a] + ε1 > R¯ta > Pr[a]− ε2, ∀a
within a finite number of rounds.
Take some small (but finite) parameter ε1 and let ε2 =
(N − 1) · ε1. Every time R¯ta > Pr[a] + ε1 a helpful strategy
prescribes a report other than a which triggers un update
of the public statistics that decreases the frequency of a.
In fact, every report different than a decreases the public
frequency of a by at least:
R¯a
t − R¯at+1 = Ra∑
aRa
− Ra
1 +
∑
aRa
Since this decrease is finite for any finite round t, it follows
that the public frequency of the answer a will decrease bellow
Pr[a] + ε1 within a finite number of rounds.
The same argument holds for all other answers in A, so that
after a finite number of rounds, R¯ta < Pr[a]+ε1 for all a ∈ A.
However, ∑
R¯a =
∑
P [a] = 1
1− R¯a =
∑
b6=a
R¯b <
∑
b 6=a
P [b] + (N − 1)ε1
and therefore:
R¯a > 1−
∑
b6=a
P [b]− (N − 1)ε1 = P [a]− (N − 1)ε1
which completes the first step of our proof.
The second step of the proof is to show that the priors of
the agents converge to the true population profile. The ar-
gument above shows that there is a potentially infinite se-
quence of rounds where the helpful strategy will dictate hon-
est reporting. In each of these rounds, the future agents
learn from the submitted reports, and update their pri-
ors with the reports published by the principal. Given a
long enough sequence of Bayesian updates, the priors of the
agents converge to the true population profile.
4.2 Helpful payment mechanisms
Theorem 3 shows that helpful strategies converge the public
statistics of reports to the true population profile, and there-
fore, the focus of the next result is to show that the principal
can design a payment mechanism that makes helpful report-
ing an equilibrium.
By analogy, we define the helpful payment mechanisms as
the family of payment functions τ that support a helpful re-
porting Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. The key property of a
helpful payment mechanism is to encourage truthful report-
ing when the agents’ prior beliefs are close enough to the
public statistics R¯.
Restating the equilibrium conditions from Equation (2) the
payment function τ must satisfy the following set of con-
straints:
N∑
i=1
Pr[ai|a]
(
τ(a, ai, R¯t)− τ(b, ai, R¯t)
)
> 0, ∀a 6= b; (3)
Theorem 4. There always exist ε1 and ε2 such that help-
ful reporting is a BNE under the following payment function:
τ(a, b, R¯) =
{
0 if a 6= b
1
R¯a
if a = b
(4)
Proof. First, let us prove that helpful reporting is a BNE
when the the public information R¯t is far from the prior
Pr[·]. We must show that no agent has the incentive to
report a when R¯a > Pr[a] + ε1, for some value of ε1 that
will be derived below. This follows trivially: since the pay-
ment (4) only rewards matching reports, any deviation to
reporting a will have zero chance of being matched by the
reference report (assumed helpful as well) and generates an
expected payment of zero.
Next, let us prove that helpful reporting is an equilibrium
strategy when:
Pr[a] + ε1 > R¯ta > Pr[a]− ε2
Let us now consider the expected payment of an agent who
believes the answer a, truthfully reports a and get’s paid
according to the payment function (4):
E[V (a, a)] =
N∑
i=1
Pr[ai|a]τ(a, ai, R¯) = Pr[a|a]
R¯a
and
Pr[a|a]
R¯a
>
Pr[a|a]
Pr[a] + ε1
On the other hand, and agent who believes a but falsely
reports b expects a payment:
E[V (a, b)] =
N∑
i=1
Pr[ai|a]τ(b, ai, R¯) = Pr[b|a]
R¯b
<
Pr[b|a]
Pr[b]− ε2
We will show that there always exist the parameters ε1 and
ε2 = (N − 1)ε1 such that:
Pr[a|a]
Pr[a] + ε1
>
Pr[b|a]
Pr[b]− ε2
The inequality above can be transformed as:
Pr[a|a]Pr[b]− Pr[b|a]Pr[a] > Pr[b|a]ε1 + Pr[a|a]ε2 (5)
and by replacing ε2 we obtain:
ε1 (Pr[b|a] + (N − 1)Pr[a|a]) < Pr[a|a]Pr[b]−Pr[b|a]Pr[a]
and
ε1 <
Pr[a|a]Pr[b]− Pr[b|a]Pr[a]
Pr[b|a] + (N − 1)Pr[a|a] (6)
However, Pr[b|a]Pr[a] = Pr[a|b]Pr[b] by Bayes’ Law and
since our assumptions require Pr[a|b] < Pr[a|a], we have
Pr[a|a]Pr[b]− Pr[b|a]Pr[a] > 0, ∀a, b ∈ A
which means that one can always find ε1 and ε2 to satisfy the
inequality (5). Hence the payment mechanism described by
this theorem supports a helpful reporting equilibrium.
Note that Theorem 4, just like Theorem 2, does not specify
the equilibrium behavior when the public information is far
from the prior belief. The only constraint on the reporting
strategy is not to report an answer that is already over-
represented in the public statistics.
While many strategies will be in equilibrium, two obvious
choice are:
• The report that generates the highest expected pay-
ment:
s(a, R¯) = arg max
b
(
1
R¯b
)
• The report which bridges the biggest relative gap be-
tween the private posterior belief of the agent and the
public statistics:
s(a, R¯) = b∗ = arg max
b
(
Pr[b|a]
R¯b
)
This latter strategy is particularly interesting because it is
also a best response when a certain subset of agents are
altruistic and always report the truth:
• if the reference report comes from a rational agents
following the helpful strategy (i.e., also reporting b∗)
the expected payment is:
1
R¯a
.
• if the reference report is honest the expected payment
is:
Pr[b∗|a]
R¯b∗
and neither can be improved by reporting something else
than b∗.
5. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Let us illustrate the payment function and the helpful equi-
librium for the numerical example presented at the begin-
ning of Section 4. Consider a question with three possible
answers, A = {a, b, c} and a common prior belief about pop-
ulation profiles characterized by a Dirichlet distribution with
the parameters α = (2, 2, 1). Therefore, the prior probabili-
ties of the answers a, b and c are:
Pr[a] =
2
5
= 0.4; Pr[b] = 0.4; Pr[c] =
1
5
= 0.2
the posterior probabilities are:
Pr[a|a] = 3/6, P r[b|a] = 2/6, P r[c|a] = 1/6
Pr[a|b] = 2/6, P r[b|b] = 3/6, P r[c|b] = 1/6
Pr[a|c] = 2/6, P r[b|c] = 2/6, P r[c|c] = 2/6
and the public statistics before the beginning of round 1 is:
R¯0a = 1/3, R¯
0
b = 1/3, R¯
0
c = 1/3
In round 1 the principal defines the payment mechanism as
in Theorem 4:
τ(a, a) = 3, τ(b, b) = 3, τ(c, c) = 3, τ(ai, aj) = 0 ∀ai 6= aj
And the helpful equilibrium requires truthful reporting if
and only if:
Pr[x] + ε1 > R¯x > Pr[x]− ε2 ∀x ∈ A
The parameters ε1 and ε2 must satisfy the constraints (6)
which become:
ε1 <
Pr[a|a]Pr[b]− Pr[b|a]Pr[a]
Pr[b|a] + (N − 1)Pr[a|a] = 0.05
ε2 = (N − 1)ε1 < 0.1
The helpful reporting strategy requires the agent to report
either a or b regardless of their opinion.
6. DISCUSSION
One limitation of the mechanism we present in this paper
is that it is vulnerable to collusion. Since payments are
awarded for matching reports, the agents have incentives
to coordinate their reports on the same value. As long as
the public statistics is far from the prior beliefs, collusive
behavior is actually consistent with helpful reporting: the
most profitable collusion strategy is:
s(a, R¯) = b′ = arg max
b
1
R¯b
which does satisfy the constraints of Definition 1 since R¯b′ >
Pr[b′] for the report b′ which corresponds to the smallest
value in the probability distribution R¯.
Collusion, however, is an important problem once the pub-
lic information is sufficiently close to the prior beliefs and
helpful reporting prescribes honest reporting. A complete
solution to collusive behavior will be addressed in our fu-
ture work; several directions we are currently investigating
are:
• randomized mechanisms, that make it hard for an agent
to predict which reference report will be used to com-
pute her payment
• statistical methods that detect collusive patterns based
on the distribution of reports submitted in previous
rounds
• use the fact that in many practical systems many users
will be altruistic and will report honestly regardless of
the incentive mechanism
• use more than one reference report and leverage the
positive results presented in [9] to automatically com-
pute a payment mechanism that is resistant to collu-
sion.
One practical property of prediction markets is that the
subsidies to the market are bounded, such that the prin-
cipal knows exactly what is the worst case price he has to
pay for the information elicited through the market. The
Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) [17] method provides even
stronger guarantees by being budget balanced. We believe,
however, that budget-balance is not a desirable property for
online polls and questionnaires. The total payments break
even only when some agents lose money. The same would
be true for prediction markets, despite the subsidy of the
market owner. While both prediction markets and the BTS
mechanism are ex-ante individually rational (i.e., agents do
not expect to lose money by entering the mechanism), they
are not ex-post individually rational (IR).
We see two problems with reward mechanisms that are not
ex-post IR. First, the negative payoffs require some mecha-
nism to collect payments from the participants. The collec-
tion should happen before participation, because the nature
of the internet makes it impossible to later track down agents
and extract payments. While entry fees might seem reason-
able for a market, we cannot imagine an opinion poll where
agents pay to submit their opinion.
Second, the possibility of losing money may also deter par-
ticipation. Opinion polls depend on a large number of agents
expressing their opinions, so we strongly believe that every
participant should leave the poll with some reward. Under
these conditions, budget balance is not a feasible property.
Our mechanism can, however, guarantee upper bounds on
the budget spent by the principal. The worst case payment
made for one report is maxb
1
R¯b
which although big, is still
finite for any probability distribution R¯ with a full support
(e.g., every answer has at least one count in the public statis-
tic). Therefore, by limiting the number of participants, the
principal automatically sets limits on the maximum payment
he has to make to the agents.
A second alternative is to scale down the rewards as more
information becomes available. The marginal information
contributed by every new opinion decreases, hence it is also
natural to decrease the reward for later opinions. The re-
wards defined by Theorem 4 can be scaled by a constant
δ that decreases exponentially with the number of already
submitted opinions. Even when the poll runs indefinitely,
the payments made by the principal will converge to zero,
and the total budget will be bounded.
Yet a third alternative to limit the budget is to forbid reports
on the answers that are very unlikely. The proof of Theorem
3 shows that agents must at some point report the answer
a if they believe the probability Pr[a] is greater than the
public statistics R¯a. If the public probability of a stays low
for a long sequence of reports, it must be that the agents
do not believe in the answer a, and hence the principal can
take the answer out of the poll. The description of the exact
mechanism which allows the principal to modify the set of
possible answers remains for future work.
Another disadvantage of our mechanism is the speed of con-
vergence. When compared to a simple poll mechanism (i.e.,
no payment mechanisms, agents are assumed to report truth-
fully) the helpful reporting equilibrium converges slower: the
agents update their private belief only with the reports sub-
mitted in the rounds where the public information approx-
imates well enough the prior beliefs. This potentially hap-
pens only once every k rounds, hence the slower progress.
When compared to a prediction market, the convergence of
our mechanism is even slower. The participants in a predic-
tion market can trade multiple shares and thus instantly set
the market price of an alternative to the probability they
privately believe to be true.
Peer prediction methods can be modified to also elicit prob-
ability distributions over the answers. For example, the BTS
mechanism asks all agents to report their expectation of the
final result of the poll, and uses a divergence-based payment
to incentivize honest reporting. While the elicitation of the
full probability distribution over the answers may be prac-
tically prohibitive, we are planning to investigate simpler
alternatives, where, for example, the agent also indicates
by how much the public information is wrong. A concrete
mechanism with this property will be addressed in future
work.
One last point we would like to stress is that the rewards
need not be monetary payments. Status or bonus points,
preferential QoS, lottery tickets or any other assets that
users value can also be used. Effective micro-payment sys-
tems are still hard to implement, fortunately however, users
seem to care enough about virtual currencies [19] to make
the implementation of such reward mechanisms feasible.
7. CONCLUSION
Obtaining and aggregating the private information of in-
dividual agents has the potential to greatly improve the
decision process across a wide range of domains. Markets
proved very efficient for extracting predictions about claims
and facts that can be precisely verified in the near future.
All other non-verifiable information, such as implications of
alternative policies, long term effects, subjective or artistic
impressions can only be elicited through opinion polls and
questionnaires.
This paper addresses the reporting incentives for rational
agents in such scenarios. We impose a practical constraint
on the mechanism by requiring the rewards be independent
of the prior beliefs of the agents. In a first result we show
that prior-independent payments are not able to support a
strict truthful equilibrium in all settings. The main contri-
bution of the paper, however, is to describe a reward scheme
that supports a helpful equilibrium, where occasional miss-
reports still let the principal derive accurate information
from the poll.
Despite the limitations mentioned in Section 6 we believe
our work makes an important step towards the practical ac-
ceptance of reward mechanisms when eliciting information
from the crowds. First, the reward mechanism is very sim-
ple, and does not require the users to understand how a
market or a scoring rule functions. Second, its correctness
does not depend on a principal making correct guesses about
the beliefs of the agents. Third, helpful strategies are intu-
itive to explain and coexist well with altruistic reporting.
Finally, the mechanism can be readily integrated into exist-
ing frameworks, and does not require significant changes to
the current processes used to elicit feedback online.
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